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Abstract 
Case studies suggest that ethnic groups with autonomous institutional 
arrangements are more prone to secede, but other evidence indicates 
that autonomy reduces the likelihood of secession. To address this 
debate, we disaggregate their autonomy status into three categories—
currently autonomous, never autonomous, and lost autonomy—and 
then unpack how each shapes the logic of collective action. We argue 
groups that were never autonomous are unlikely to mobilize due to a 
lack of collective action capacity, whereas currently autonomous groups 
may have the capacity but often lack the motivation. Most important, 
groups that have lost autonomy often possess both strong incentives 
and the capacity to pursue secession, which facilitates collective action. 
Moreover, autonomy retraction weakens the government’s ability to 
make future credible commitments to redress grievances. We test these 
conjectures with data on the autonomous status and separatist behavior 
of 324 groups in more than 100 countries from 1960 to 2000. Our 
analysis shows clear empirical results regarding the relationship 
between autonomy status and separatism. Most notably, we find that 
formerly autonomous groups are the most likely to secede, and that 
both currently autonomous and never autonomous groups are much 
less likely. 
Keywords 
nationalism, separatism, decentralization, autonomy 
Does autonomy satisfy the demand for more self-determination, or instead 
foster the capacity and whet the appetite for independence? Is political 
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decentralization a viable solution for multiethnic states, or a slippery slope? 
Some scholars and policymakers see autonomy as the main mechanism to 
resolve tensions and redistributive issues between the central government and 
spatially concentrated, culturally distinct groups (Bermeo, 2002; Bermeo & 
Amoretti, 2003; L. Diamond, 1999; Stepan, 1999). Others studies, however, 
show that autonomy can actually exacerbate relations between the state and 
ethnic groups, for it cultivates the capacity for collective action and self-rule 
without significantly reducing desire for more of it (Brancati, 2009; Bunce, 
1999; Coppieters, 2001; Cornell, 2002; Roeder, 1991). 
This article posits that the theoretical and empirical disagreement over the 
effect of autonomy is partly due to conflating two distinct situations in the 
implicit reference category—groups that are not autonomous. This binary 
classification compares groups that are currently autonomous to a baseline 
that is comprised of both groups that have never been autonomous, and those 
that once had autonomy, but lost it. Groups that have never been autonomous 
and those that have lost autonomy are distinct in their motivation and their 
capacity for collective action. Whereas never autonomous groups may be 
unlikely to mobilize due to a lack of collective action capacity, currently 
autonomous groups may have such capacity, but should find the cost of 
attempting to alter the status quo too high compared with the benefits they 
currently enjoy from being autonomous. Most important, we argue that 
groups which have lost autonomy possess both powerful incentives in the 
form of grievances and often also have the capacity for collective action 
capacity, which leads us to expect such groups to be more likely to pursue 
secession. 
Following previous studies, we define autonomy as a form of internal self-
determination that provides a group with actual powers and resources for 
self-governance within a state (Brancati, 2009; Wolff, 2013; Zinn, 2006).
1
 
Specifically, we build on Wolff’s (2013) definition of “territorial self-
governance,” which he describes as “legally entrenched power of 
territorially-delimited entities within the internationally recognized 
boundaries of existing states to exercise public policy functions 
independently of other sources of authority in this state, but subject to its 
overall legal order” (p. 5). To this definition, we add Stepan’s (1999) of 
asymmetric arrangements, meaning that the powers devolved to a group must 
not apply for all of the groups within the state. For example, the United 
States has symmetric federal arrangements—in theory, states are all treated 
equally relative to the central government. In other countries, such as Spain, 
Indonesia, and Canada, particular regions are granted asymmetric 
autonomous arrangements above and beyond what other regions within the 
state possess. For example, the government in Catalonia in Spain, currently 
headed by a regionalist-nationalist party (Convergència Democràtica de 
Catalunya, the CDC), possesses high levels of formal autonomy through the 
constitution and high levels of control over the day-to-day affairs within the 
province.
2
 As a result, Catalonia is coded as currently autonomous. 
We do not blindly follow formal laws, however, but also consider the 
degree of de facto autonomy (especially in autocracies) in determining 
whether to code a case as autonomous. For example, although Tibet is 
officially as an autonomous region in China, the Chinese government exerts 
considerable control over the Tibetan government, appoints administrators 
from foreign regions and directly selects its own Dalai Lama as an attempt to 
control Tibetan religious organizations, a key consideration considering the 
role of Monks in Tibetan society. We therefore code Tibet as having lost 
autonomy in 1949.
3
 
We argue that groups which have recently lost autonomy should be more 
likely to engage in separatism than groups that are currently autonomous or 
groups that were never autonomous, ceteris paribus. We hypothesize that lost 
autonomy increases the likelihood of separatism through four main 
mechanisms. First, it fosters ethnic resentment as a result of diminished 
status, which engenders grievances that are increasingly hard to appease (e.g., 
Petersen, 2002). Second, it weakens the central government’s ability to make 
credible commitments, which reduces the viability of conciliatory political 
strategies (e.g., Hale, 2008a; Hale, 2008b). 
Third, retracting autonomy does not necessarily curb the group’s 
collective action capacity, which was gained and developed under autonomy, 
as leadership loss, generational replacement, and assimilation are relatively 
slow processes (Siroky and Aprasdize, 2011). Finally, while the free rider 
problem is widely recognized, we suggest that the cost of free riding within a 
group that recently lost autonomy may be higher than joining forces with 
those who seek separation (Hechter, 2000; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007), thus 
making lost autonomy a particularly powerful basis for secession. Currently 
autonomous groups must weigh the potential loss of their current status 
against their unrealized desire for full independence, and we therefore predict 
that they should be less prone to secession than those that recently lost 
autonomy. 
We develop this logic and derive several key empirical implications in the 
next section. Using a data set that builds on the latest data sources on ethnic 
politics and conflict, and covers roughly 330 ethnically distinct groups in 
more than 110 states over a 40-year period, our analysis indicates that 
formerly autonomous groups are the most likely to secede, whereas currently 
autonomous and never autonomous groups were significantly less likely to do 
so. These results provide strong evidence regarding the impact of lost 
autonomy on separatism, and are robust to matching on covariates, 
instrumental variables, different estimators, and confounding variables.
4
 We 
also find, in most models, that currently autonomous have a higher propensity 
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for separatism than groups that have never been autonomous. The results 
shed new light on existing empirical results, and contribute to the long-
standing debate regarding the relationship between autonomy and separatism. 
The final section discusses potential implications of this study for the design 
of institutions in multiethnic countries and proposes several directions for 
future research. 
A Theory of Lost Autonomy 
We situate our contribution within the context of debates over the effect of 
decentralized institutions—specifically, the effect of regional autonomy—on 
nationalist mobilization and separatism (Bunce, 1999; Hale, 2000; Hechter & 
Okamoto, 2001; Horowitz, 1985; Kymlicka, 2008; Miodownik & Cartrite, 
2010; Rogowski, 1985; Sambanis & Zinn, 2005; Treisman, 1997). 
Proponents of autonomous institutional arrangements argue that political 
decentralization is the primary means by which a large multiethnic state can 
relieve ethno-regional tensions on its periphery and preserve a unified polity 
(Brass, 1991; Gurr, 2000; Kaufman, 1996; Lijphart, 1977; McGarry & 
O’Leary, 1993; Stepan, 1999; Tsebelis, 1990). The language of self-
determination and minority rights, which was originally used by the Great 
Powers to redraw boundaries after World War I, and later used to justify the 
process of decolonization, has been increasingly utilized by ethnic minority 
groups, which have wielded it effectively to extract concessions from the 
central government (Jenne, 2007; Jenne, 2010). 
Most recently, decentralization of power to ethnic regions has been touted 
as a potential solution to tensions with ethnic minority groups in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (O’Hanlon & Joseph, 2007), and has been discussed in many 
other hot spot regions around the world, including the Balkans (Guss & 
Siroky, 2012), Ethiopia (Ghai, 2000), and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
(Forrest, 2004). Many studies have shown that autonomy bears a strong 
relationship to peace in the developed world (e.g., Spain, Germany, the 
United States, Switzerland, Australia) and in the developing world (e.g., 
Nigeria, India, Mexico, Ethiopia). Autonomy “has done more to relieve or 
contain secessionist pressures,” wrote Larry Diamond (1999), “than to 
stimulate them” (p. 156). Stepan (1999) reinforces this point when he notes 
that “every single longstanding democracy in a multilingual and 
multinational polity is a federal state” (p. 19). 
Decentralization as an approach to ethnic conflict management is certainly 
not without its detractors, who argue that centrifugal concessions to ethnic 
groups create a “slippery slope” of increasing demands for self-
determination. Autonomy is unlikely to satisfy a group’s demands for self-
rule, in this view, and is much more likely to reinforce ethnic particularism 
and prejudices by providing group leaders with the symbolic and material 
resources needed to mobilize co-ethnics against the state (Ghai, 2000). This 
form of minority concession may also engender a strong political backlash 
(Bustikova, 2014). In short, scholars have argued that autonomy serves as the 
basis for secessionism by sharpening borders, “constructing” nations, and 
fostering centrifugal incentives among regional elites (Cornell, 2002; 
Slezkine, 1994; Streat-Bartlett, 2009). 
If there is a consensus in this literature, then it can only be that the net 
impact of autonomy is mixed, contingent on other factors, for example, the 
strength of regional parties, the existence of prior conflicts, the level of 
development, the wider geopolitical environment, and so on (Brancati, 2009; 
Jenne, 2010). It would appear that autonomy has no consistent empirical 
relationship with separatist activity, even though there is case study evidence 
to support arguments both in favor and against it (Cornell, 2002; Roeder, 
1991; Stepan, 1999). In short, the empirical record remains “murky” (Hechter 
& Okamoto, 2001), and we aim to provide some conceptual and empirical 
clarity regarding the relationship between autonomy and separatism. 
We suggest that to advance this debate it is crucial to disaggregate the 
implicit baseline of comparison—“non-autonomous status.” A binary 
(autonomous or not) framing of the debate over the effect of autonomy masks 
two distinct scenarios: one in which an ethnic group has never been 
autonomous, and another in which an ethnic group lost their autonomy. 
Although both are technically not autonomous, we predict that one group 
(lost autonomy) is highly prone to separatism, whereas the other group (never 
autonomous) is very unlikely to pursue secession, because on average they 
lack both the leadership and grievances required for collective action (Saxton, 
2005). 
By contrast, currently autonomous groups are more likely to have the 
capacity to overcome collective action problems. The capacity for separatism 
is largely irrelevant, however, if autonomous groups lack the desire for 
secession, either because the status quo satisfies their demand for self-
determination or the potential risks associated with rebellion are excessively 
great. Most important, we predict the greatest amount of separatist activity 
from groups that were recently deprived of autonomy—those groups that 
experienced a shift from indirect rule to direct rule (Hechter, 2013; Siroky 
and Aprasdize, 2011; Siroky, Dzutsev, & Hechter, 2013). Retracted or lost 
autonomy provides a strong motive and need not significantly diminish the 
group’s collective action capacity. Moreover, it considerably weakens the 
government’s ability to make credible commitments that might otherwise 
prevent tensions from escalating, making “voice” seem less likely to yield 
positive results than exit, thereby increasing the probability of secession 
(Hirschman, 1970; North & Weingast, 1989; Siroky and Aprasdize, 2011). 
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Lost autonomy is not a new idea in political science. Gurr (1993) and Gurr 
and Moore (1997), for example, both emphasized the impact of lost 
autonomy on rebellion. Our approach builds on this earlier literature and 
extends it in two key ways. First, rather than comparing groups that have lost 
autonomy to all other groups, we distinguish and disaggregate between 
groups that have never been autonomous, groups that are currently 
autonomous and groups that have lost autonomy. This conceptualization, we 
suggest, offers better traction on the relationship between autonomy and 
separatism than a binary classification. Second, we hypothesize that lost 
autonomy engenders resentment, which increases the group’s grievances, 
reduces the government’s capacity to make future credible commitments that 
might bring cooler heads and calmer voices to the fore, and does not 
necessarily reduce the collective action capacities and advantages that groups 
gained during autonomy (i.e., leaders, elite networks, and administrative 
experience). Autonomy retraction may also decrease a group’s collective 
action problems by increasing the cost of free riding relative to participation 
(Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007).
5
 In sum, we argue that lost autonomy enhances 
both the motives and the capacities for collective action, and reduces the 
government’s ability to extend incentives and attract moderates. This makes 
such groups (in the grey shaded box, Table 1) more likely to pursue secession 
than those groups with no history of autonomy and those that are currently 
autonomous (in the unshaded boxes, Table 1). This leads us to derive two 
main hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Groups that have lost autonomy are more likely to pursue 
separatism than currently autonomous groups. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Currently autonomous groups are more likely to pursue 
separatism than groups with no history of autonomy. 
Before we test these hypotheses more rigorously, we first explore their 
plausibility with four cases from distinct regions—Eastern Europe, East Asia, 
South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. These illustrative vignettes highlight the 
process of secession following the loss of autonomy, which we contrast 
against the group’s behavior during and before autonomy, as a means to 
examine how well the causal mechanisms operate across several 
geographically diverse settings, and to complement the quantitative analysis 
that follows. 
Table 1.Theoretical Expectations. 
 Low capacity High capacity 
Weak motives Never autonomous, 
included groups 
Currently autonomous groups 
Strong motives Never autonomous, 
excluded groups 
Historically autonomous groups 
(Separatism most likely) 
Four Vignettes 
Kosovo’s Secession 
Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were granted special considerations under the 
1946 Constitution, and were later granted full autonomy as a province 
(Autonomna Pokrajina) in 1974 (Kubo, 2011). However, this situation was 
quickly reversed in 1990, when the region effectively returned to its pre-1974 
status. Slobodan Milosevic’s increasing power within the quickly 
fragmenting Yugoslavia, along with the local government’s discriminatory 
policies toward ethnic Serbians (McGwire, 2000), led to public resentment 
over the perceived “extremity” of Kosovo’s autonomy within Yugoslavia 
(Petersen, 2002), and soon resulted in the formal revocation of Kosovo’s 
autonomy in 1990 through constitutional changes (Silber, Little, & British 
Broadcast Corporation, 1996; Zimmermann, 1999). These changes included 
abolishing Kosovo’s official public media, transferring control over state-
owned companies to Belgrade, and replacing Albanian educational textbooks 
and education in the Albanian language at Pristina University. Not 
surprisingly, the revocation of autonomy led to reciprocal resentment among 
the ethnic Albanians within Kosovo. Grievances escalated on both sides, and 
so did collective action. On the Albanian side, the organizational structures 
developed during their period of autonomy were still largely in tact, and 
played a crucial role in their subsequent mobilization and eventual 
militarization. 
Two factions emerged to represent the Kosovar Albanian case: Ibrahim 
Rugova led the first group highlighting Kosovo’s distinct ethnic identity and 
heritage in ancient Dardania, a once independent kingdom and later a Roman 
province, through nonviolent means, especially in schools and cultural 
centers (Pula, 2004). The second faction, which came to be known as the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UÇK), pursued a more radical approach, 
and launched attacks against Yugoslav officials and police stations (Agence 
France Presse, 1995). Tired of Rugova’s approach, the KLA argued that 
negotiations had failed, and that a more aggressive line of attack would prove 
more effective. The KLA’s approach gained popularity among Kosovars, and 
the recruitment of volunteers as well as funding from abroad for the “national 
cause” increased between 1996 (the KLA’s first formal attack against 
Yugoslav authorities) and 1999 (the year of NATO’s intervention through 
Operation Allied Force; Judah, 2002, p. 805; Pula, 2004). 
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While revoking autonomy may have quelled discontent among Serbs in 
Kosovo, it increased grievances among the majority of Albanians in Kosovo. 
Even those individuals not directly demoted or replaced joined others in 
solidarity by engaging in civil disobedience (Clark, 2000). The structures, 
including many of the top leaders and key organizations, carried over from 
the period of autonomy and played a crucial role in Rugova’s nonviolent 
movement for self-rule, and the KLA’s ability to recruit and mobilize for 
independence. Although the full story of Kosovo’s drive for secession is 
beyond the scope of this narrative, the key elements highlighted here—the 
increased salience of grievances, the leadership, and the collective action 
capacity—were a direct result of the decision to revoke Kosovo’s autonomy 
in 1990. NATO’s intervention and other foreign support played a crucial role 
in the ultimate success of the KLA, but the initial impetus was largely 
internal. Lost autonomy stimulated popular discontent and served to make 
secession, which had led to outright war in Bosnia and Croatia and was thus 
risky, into an increasingly attractive alternative to continued negotiations 
with Belgrade (Costalli & Moro, 2012). 
South Sudanese Separatism 
The impact of lost autonomy on separatism is also evident in Sudan. 
Culturally distinct Southerners resented the Arabic North for the slave trade 
(Deng, 2006), “political marginalization, economic neglect, and cultural 
domination” (Lado, 2002, p. 159). The Addis Abba Accords ended the first 
Sudanese Civil War and granted regional autonomy to the South in 1974 
(Beshir, Mohammad-Salih, & Abdul-Jalil, 1984; Eprile, 1974), which 
initially showed some promise of reducing tensions. Over time, however, 
increasingly Islamic policies in the North resulted in a new Constitution in 
1983, which severely reduced the South’s autonomy, both politically by 
fragmenting the South into subunits (Salih, 1994) and culturally by instituting 
Islamic policies (Beshir et al., 1984). Between 1980 and 1983, the North 
seized several oil fields in the South, which exacerbated tensions and 
increased the South’s incentives to pursue its own independence.6 
The combination of political, economic, and cultural grievances let to the 
formation of an opposition Southern People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
under the leadership of former national cabinet member John Garang. The 
organization initially had the support of several international organizations 
(Adar, 1998) and of Ethiopia (Kebbede, 1997b). The removal of Northern 
President Nimeiri, due to backlash over drought, provided hope for a peaceful 
solution. In 1989, however, the National Islamic Front gained power in the 
North (Kebbede, 1997b), rescinding many of the promises made to the South 
and intensifying the conflict. 
Despite several internal divisions, the SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation 
Army) maintained an almost 30-year long separatist movement, which 
eventually led to secession (Kebbede, 1997a). The movement for Southern 
Sudan used the retraction of autonomy to powerful effect. While 
heterogeneous and sometimes rival ethnic groups vied for power within the 
movement, its focal point—a sense of cultural imperialism—sustained it. 
Moreover, leadership experience gained during the period of autonomy, 
along with experience gained from the regional legislative assembly, served 
the movement well in overcoming the collective action problem required for 
the secessionist movement to survive and ultimately to become the newest 
member of the United Nations. 
Tibetan Separatism in China 
Chinese forces invaded Tibet following the Communist takeover of mainland 
China. Although officially listed as an autonomous region, this autonomy 
exists largely as a façade. Beijing maintains strict control over Tibet and 
retains the right to “approve” the next Dalai Lama as well as repeatedly 
attempting to monitor the activities of Tibetan monks (Teufel, 2005, p. 71). 
Despite an overwhelming military defeat, the Tibetan Government in Exile 
(TGE) that subsequently formed in India has successfully served as a rallying 
point for the independence of Tibet (Cunningham & Beaulieu, 2010; Fuller, 
Morrison, Murphy, & Ridley, 2002). For over half a century, since Tibet lost 
its autonomy, the TGE has facilitated collective action and provided Tibetans 
with a unified political voice to pursue greater autonomy and independence. 
Formally and informally, Tibet lost its autonomy in 1949. Tibet 
subsequently launched and has maintained for more than 60 years a strong 
separatist movement (Sautman, 2005), even being characterized as China’s 
“most rebellious” territory (Karmel, 1995). Although Tibet may have trouble 
overcoming Chinese rule and gaining independence due to China’s military 
and economic superiority, Tibet has maintained its cohesion as a movement 
for many decades, and this resilience stems in part from its ability to rally 
supporters around the issue of its lost autonomy and the need for 
independence as the only means to preserve its distinct cultural identity. 
Leadership experience gained when Tibet was autonomous has served the 
TGE in its difficult role of maintaining the movement over several decades 
and against a determined and strong state. Now based in northern India, the 
TGE as initially composed of former ministers who escaped the war and 
provided the leadership capacity to form and foster a coherent movement for 
independence. The Dalai Lama, a powerful cultural and spiritual symbol for 
Tibetans, is a carryover from the period of Tibetan autonomy. Until his 
retirement in 2011, he served as the head of state for the TGE after fleeing 
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Tibet a decade after the initial invasion. Although his stance has softened on 
the best course of action for Tibet (He & Sautman, 2005), the Tibetan 
leadership still insists Tibet and China do not share a common cultural 
identity, which serves as the basis for its claims to autonomy (Karmel, 1995). 
Even though Tibet is not economically-vital for China, holding firm 
demonstrates the regime’s ability to resist international pressures (Gladney, 
2003; Sautman, 1999; Walsh, 1993). 
Assamese Separatism in India 
A fully autonomous region during the first decades of Indian independence, 
the Assamese began to engage in separatist activity in earnest in the late 
1970s following India’s campaign of “internal colonialism” (Darnell & 
Parikh, 1988; Hechter, 1975). The Indian central government had been 
progressively encroaching on the traditional homeland of the Assamese since 
the 1970s. Tensions between “Assamese regional patriotism and pan-
Indianism” (Baruah, 2009, p. 953) escalated throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
(Gurr, 2009), especially during the 1983 local elections (Baruah, 2009; 
Dasgupta & Guha, 1985), and came to a fountainhead following the formal 
retraction of autonomy in 1991 and the subsequent military operations 
(Misra, 1995). 
Indian expansion into Assam had, over many years, engendered strong 
grievances toward the central government, and prompted some early signs of 
collective action (e.g., protests, strikes) and later led to calls for independence 
(Darnell & Parikh, 1988). While Indian authorities have been able to arrest 
many individual operators of the United Front for the Liberation of Assam 
(UFLA), they have not removed “the soil that germinates the rebels” (Kalita, 
2009, p. 102). The “soil” has two components that help to overcome the 
collective action problem: First, a strong sense of injustice at having their 
autonomy reduced and ultimately retracted, and second, the leadership and 
political capabilities developed during autonomy, first with the Movement for 
Assam in the late 1970s and then with the UFLA, and through ties to the 
former regional legislative assembly (Baruah, 2009). Both of these factors 
have combined to sustain the movement for an independent Assam, despite 
the overwhelming economic and military superiority of the Indian state, and 
continue to serve as the movement’s focal point for mobilization. 
Summary of Vignettes 
Although these cases all take place at different times and on different 
continents, a key dynamic clearly emerges and illustrates how lost autonomy 
increased separatism relative both to the period during and prior to autonomy. 
The case studies also clearly establish that, after losing autonomy, the groups 
were struggling to move beyond autonomy, which was no longer credible, 
rather than to regain autonomous status. When the central authorities 
retracted autonomy from each of these groups (or full independence, in the 
case of Tibet), the ethnic groups all responded by mobilizing and engaging in 
sustained collective action to separate and establish an independent state. 
This mobilization was more sustained and significant than collective action 
during and before autonomy. 
In Kosovo, the central government in Belgrade limited regional powers 
and replaced local leaders with Belgrade-backed candidates. This led to the 
“decisive protests” by Albanian workers that soon spread throughout the 
region (Pula, 2004, p. 803). In the Sudan, the government in Khartoum 
redrew the administrative lines of the South’s autonomous region to control 
oil supplies (Bennett, 1987) and later abolished the local government 
(Kebbede, 1997a). This led to the formation of the South Sudanese Liberation 
Army and widespread violence that dwarfed the conflict during and before 
the period of autonomy, and ultimately resulted in a new state that has been 
universally recognized. In Assam, the central government in New Delhi first 
interfered directly into the economic affairs in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
and then formally revoked the region’s autonomy. This led to significant 
violence and collective action aimed at secession from India, whereas prior 
tensions had only been fully within the framework of autonomy. 
In each case, revoking autonomy triggered collective action. If this 
relationship was endogenous—autonomy drove separatist collective action, 
which led to autonomy retraction, then groups that lost autonomy should be 
less separatist than groups that are currently autonomous, because the group 
has lost the capacity to secede that it enjoyed under autonomy. The evidence 
in these cases does not support this causal ordering, and instead indicates that 
the retraction of autonomy is what led to an increase in separatist activity 
rather than the reverse; the time period prior to autonomy appears to be most 
quiescent, and the period after lost autonomy the most likely to witness 
separatism. 
Between 1974 and 1990, Kosovo was relatively peaceful (Malcom, 1998). 
Prior to Indian independence from Britain, Assam had no history of large-
scale rebellion (Sinha, 2007). Tibet was its own independent nation prior to 
the Chinese takeover, and thus could not exhibit separatism (Shakya, 1999). 
Although it is true that South Sudan was certainly not calm prior to gaining 
autonomy, it is clear that the period after autonomy was revoked generated a 
conflict of a different order, resulting in three times as many deaths and to the 
demand for separation of the South from the North (Biel, 2003; Kebbede, 
1997b). Analyzing these cases from the perspective of autonomy status 
indicates that lost autonomy is significantly more likely to produce 
separatism than autonomy, and that the period prior to autonomy is the least 
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likely to spawn separatism. While some of these cases exhibited disputes 
over status prior to the loss of autonomy, in all cases the revocation of 
autonomy escalated the group’s demands, generated sustained separatist 
movements and resulted in widespread violence. 
The next section analyzes how well the findings from these four cases 
generalize using newly disaggregated global data on autonomy and separatist 
activity. 
Data Description 
Our unit of analysis is the ethnic group-year within an individual state, 
measured every 5 years beginning in 1960 until 2000. This unit of analysis 
allows us to analyze the differential mobilization of the same group in 
different states. For example, using the research design, we are able to 
analyze why the Kurds have mobilized in Turkey and Iraq much more than in 
Iran and Syria. Moreover, the mechanisms that motivate the theoretical 
relationship between lost autonomy and separatism focus on the relationship 
between the ethnic group and the host state rather than on linkages across 
borders between groups that are nominally the same. Common ethnic 
ancestry does not necessarily imply cooperation across borders. Institutional 
differences between states, for instance, can drastically alter perceptions of 
ethnicity, the salience of cleavages and the demand for separatism.
7
 Most 
important, one state may change the autonomous status of an ethnic minority, 
while the other state does not, which would lead us to expect different group 
behavior and outcomes. For instance, the retraction of autonomy in South 
Ossetia (in Georgia) was not matched by the retraction of autonomy in North 
Ossetia (Russia), and the former mobilized for separatism, whereas the latter 
did not. The group-year-state research design allows us to capture these 
crucial differences that would be blurred if we were to use a more aggregated 
unit of analysis. 
We built our data set drawing upon two primary sources. As our baseline, 
we used the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set,
8
 and then added 
additional data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project.
9
 For groups that 
were omitted from the EPR and MAR data sets, or coded differently across 
the two data sources, we conducted our search to sort out discrepancies. 
When groups had the same name between MAR and EPR, the data were 
merged for every group-year. For groups that were not in both MAR and 
EPR, we determined whether one or the other data set: (1) had an 
exchangeable name for the same group, (2) had aggregated distinct groups 
into a larger category, or (3) had no equivalent in the other data set. In the 
case of (1), we simply renamed the group to ensure a match. In cases of (2), 
we used the more disaggregated data, and in cases of (3), we included the 
unmatched group in the new data set, and coded missing covariates using 
secondary sources, if possible. 
Our dependent variable is constructed on the basis of MAR’s Separatism 
Index, which we transformed from a 4-point unordered scale into a binary 
indicator of a sustained political movement for separatism on behalf of an 
ethnic group between 1960 and 2000.
10
 We also validated the coding of every 
case in terms of its formal loss of autonomy and the timing of separatism 
using qualitative data, and in most cases found that the coding from MAR 
and EPR were accurate. When we could not identify clear separatist 
movements, despite a civil war involving distinct ethnic groups, we adopted a 
conservative approach and coded the group as having no separatist 
movement. This was especially relevant in cases of revolutionary conflict in 
which the parties to the conflict could be distinguished by ethnicity (e.g., the 
Democratic Republic of Congo), but none of the groups sought to separate 
from the central state. 
Our main independent variable is a trichotomous indicator of a group’s 
autonomy status. We utilize Wolff’s criteria for “territorial self-governance” 
with the qualification that the powers granted to groups must be asymmetric 
within a state. To operationalize this concept, we relied on several sources. If 
MAR’s autonomy status indicator showed the group was autonomous in the 
given year, we coded this as autonomous, unless it did not possess de facto 
autonomy (e.g., Tibet). To distinguish between never autonomous groups and 
those who lost their autonomy, we used MAR’s AUTLOST index. This index 
measures when, and to what degree, a group lost their autonomy. Any group 
who’s AUTLOST score was equal to or greater than “1” and where a specific 
year of autonomy retraction was identified either through MAR’s “autonend” 
variable, the MAR Qualitative data on the group and EPR’s “demoted” 
variable—was coded as having lost autonomy.11 This triangulation of coding 
enables us to guarantee that we do not conflate any level of participation by 
the central state in a group’s affairs as autonomy loss by supplementing the 
level of autonomy loss with an identifiable event such as an invasion or 
constitutional amendment. 
In addition to the group’s autonomy status, we also included data on 
several other relevant covariates. First, to control for differences across 
regime types, we include a trichotomous indicator of regime type 
(democracies, autocracies, and hybrid regimes), drawing on the expanded 
Polity 4 project data (Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, & O’Halloran, 
2006; K. S. Gleditsch, 2008). Second, we account for the state’s exclusion of 
noncore ethnic groups from the political process using the EPR data 
(Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010; Wimmer, 2002), which has been shown 
to increase the likelihood of conflict (Wucherpfennig, Metternich, Cederman, 
& Gleditsch, 2012). We argue that a similar mechanism occurs in the more 
specific case of separatism. As the number of politically excluded or 
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vulnerable ethnic groups in a state increases, the likelihood of a group 
becoming separatist also increases. Third, we also include a measure of the 
group’s spatial concentration based on MAR’s 4-point ordinal scale GCON. 
If a group is highly concentrated, it is more likely to provide in-group social 
and economic services to its members, a key role that must be played by rebel 
organizations aiming at secession (Mampilly, 2011; Toft, 2003; Weidmann, 
2009).
12
 We also account for the presence of oil on the group’s territory as an 
indicator of economic viability and of the state’s material interest in the 
region (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Lujala, Rod, & Thieme, 2007). We include 
a measure of external support for each ethnic group based data from 
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011).
13
 We also control for GDP per 
capita at the country level, which has been widely used as a proxy for state 
capacity (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Finally, in 
several specifications, we include random effects for region and time to 
account for cross-regional and temporal heterogeneity that is not explicitly 
modeled.
14
 
Before estimating our full model, we explore the straightforward bivariate 
evidence, with autonomy status lagged 5 years. Figure 1 shows the proportion 
of cases that engaged in separatism, sorted by autonomy status. It indicates 
that, not controlling for other facts, groups which lost autonomy were 75% 
more likely to lead to separatism than groups that had autonomous status. 
Moreover, autonomous groups were almost twice as likely to lead to 
separatism than groups with no history of autonomy. 
Figure 1 does not account for the possible correlation across group-years, 
however. To account for these correlations and to investigate these 
hypotheses further, we estimate a mixed-effects logistic regression model 
using the group-level data. Our basic model in scalar form is 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. Bar plot of separatism by autonomy status. 
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where i is the subscript for a given group in a country k in time period t. Such 
a model allows us to control for correlation of observations both within each 
country and across time. In the next section, we discuss the results of our 
analysis of this model. 
Discussion of Results 
The core result shows that the loss of autonomy significantly increases the 
likelihood of separatism. Table 2 depicts this result using a nonlinear mixed 
model (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Development Core Team, 
2012). In all specifications, groups that lost autonomy were significantly 
more likely to be separatist than autonomous groups, and in most models 
groups which were never autonomous were less likely to become separatist 
  
Table 2. Nonlinear Mixed-Effects Models. 
 Dichotomous Cold War Year Full 
Classification Random effect Random effect Model 
Intercept 2.37 (1.27) 2.52 (1.45) 3.09 (1.31)* 2.58 (1.46) 
Lost autonomy — 1.85 (0.55)* 2.22 (0.58)* 1.90 (0.55)* 
Nonautonomous 0.18 (0.48) 1.33 (0.55)* 0.97 (0.58) 1.30 (0.55)* 
Hybrid regime 0.04 (0.42) 0.26 (0.47) 0.27 (0.46) 0.21 (0.47) 
Democracy 0.09 (0.31) 0.36 (0.36) 0.36 (0.36) 0.30 (0.36) 
Group concentration 1.15 (0.12)* 0.96 (0.13)* 0.94 (0.13)* 0.96 (0.13)* 
Excluded groups 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
Logged GDP per capita 0.09 (0.19) 0.02 (0.22 0.08 (0.15) 0.06 (0.22) 
Oil 0.26 (0.26) 0.22 (0.31 0.28 (0.31) 0.22 (0.31) 
External support 2.72 (0.72)* 3.15 (0.81)* 3.18 (0.82)* 3.13 (0.82)* 
Eastern Europe and (former USSR) 0.96 (0.97) 1.71 (1.05) 1.78 (1.05) 1.71 (1.08) 
Latin America 5.60 (1.28)* 5.10 (1.53)* 5.22 (1.51)* 5.19 (1.53)* 
North Africa and Middle East 0.68 (1.13) 0.68 (1.27) 0.83 (1.26) 0.71 (1.27) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.03 (0.86)* 2.16 (0.96)* 2.20 (0.96)* 2.18 (0.96)* 
Western democracies 0.09 (1.25) 0.12 (1.41) 0.44 (1.31) 0.17 (1.42) 
Year (fixed) 0.01 (0.01) 0 (0.02) — 0.00 (0.02) 
Random effects 5.28 (2.3)* 5.41 (2.33)* 7.41 (2.72)* 6.36 (2.52)* 
 Country — — 0.00 (0.01) — 
 Year — — 0.07 (0.27) — 
 Cold War 486.82 408.80 406.90 409.07 
 Log likelihood 1,005.65 855.60 849.81 852.14 
 AIC 1,087.06 952.28 941.40 938.65 
 BIC 1,198.00 1,198.00 1,198.00 1,198.00 
 Countries 100 100 100 100 
 Groups 324 324 324 324 
 Group-years 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 
Standard errors are in parentheses. AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion. 
*p < .05. 
Siroky and Cuffe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Figure 2. Separation plots of dichotomous and trichotomous model 
specifications. 
than currently autonomous groups.
15
 The results also show that highly 
spatially concentration groups are more likely to become separatist, and 
external support for an ethnic group appears to have consistently increased 
the likelihood a group becomes separatist. However, other factors thought to 
influence civil war, such as GDP per capita, the number of excluded groups 
and Oil, do not appear to be associated with more separatism. 
We also ran models with a random effect for groups within each state to 
control for the possibility that groups which launched multiple or constant 
separatist campaigns during this time period were not unduly biasing our 
data. While some interpretations change, lost autonomy is almost always 
significant at the .05 level, and never less than the .10 level. For example, a 
replication of our full model displayed in Table A2 yields identical results in 
terms of significance for the main variables of interest, available in the online 
appendix. 
In addition to examining how our covariates relate to the propensity of a 
group to engage in separatism, we are also interested in the predictive 
performance of our model specification relative to reasonable alternatives.
16
 
At the level of predictive accuracy, all models using the trichotomous 
autonomy indicator out-performed the model using a dichotomous 
classification by a substantively significant margin (Figures 2 and 3). Figure 
2 shows a separation plot (Greenhill, Ward, & Sacks, 2011), which 
graphically illustrates the classification accuracy using gray bars to indicate 
incorrect predictions of separatism, and black bars to predict correct ones. 
The thin black line indicates the predicted probability of each observation. A 
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model with perfect classification accuracy would show all black bars to the  
 
 
Figure 3. ROC plot of dichotomous and trichotomous model specifications. 
right and gray ones to the left, whereas a model no better than a coin flip 
would show equal numbers of black and gray bars on the right and the left 
side of the spectrum. 
Figure 3 shows a traditional ROC (Receiver or Relative Operating 
Characteristic) plot (NCAR: Research Application Program, 2012), which 
also illustrates the predictive accuracy. When the curve is closer to the 
northwest corner of the plot, the model provides more predictive accuracy. It 
reinforces the fact that models using the trichotomous indicator of autonomy 
out-perform models using a dichotomous indicator of autonomy. 
The proposed model demonstrates some of the important conceptual and 
empirical advantages to disaggregation, and out-perform models using a 
dichotomous indicator of autonomy in terms of precision. Figure 4 shows a 
coefficient plot for the full model, which underscores the clear positive effect 
of lost autonomy on the likelihood of secession.
17
 
 Figure 4. Coefficient plot for the full model specification in Table 2. 
Robustness 
As groups are not randomly assigned to their respective autonomy categories, 
and researchers are unable to manipulate the assignment to groups, care must 
be taken in making causal statements. 
Autonomy is retracted and lost through disparate causal processes, which 
fall outside the scope of our argument concerning its effect. Access to 
resources may encourage a state to expand into its periphery, and thus to 
encroach on an ethnic group’s traditional territory. Or the motives may be 
less economic and more political: A borderland inhabited by “ethnic others” 
is deprived of its autonomous status for fear that it may become a fifth 
column in an interstate dispute. This analysis is agnostic on which of these 
reasons best accounts for a region’s loss of autonomy, yet we would agree 
that further disaggregation along these lines could result in the discovery of 
important theoretical distinctions between economically motivated versus 
politically driven autonomy retraction and status reversal. 
Our primary concern is to address the possibility that the model is 
endogenous—separatist activity leads to the retraction of autonomy. 
Although we are careful to ensure that we code autonomy prior to separatism, 
it is impossible to know with certainty in every case that the group did not 
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display signs of separatism prior to being annexed or having its status 
demoted. In addition to examining the timing of all cases that were coded as 
having lost autonomy, we also pursued more formal techniques to ensure the 
robustness of the results, including pre-processing the data using genetic 
matching, instrumental variables regression and a Bayesian approach to 
generalized mixed models. 
Genetic Matching is a method that seeks to make results less dependent 
upon modeling assumptions. By balancing data using “treatment” and 
“control” groups, the goal is to break any potential link between the treatment 
variable and the other covariates by ensuring that both treatment and control 
groups have similar distributions of covariates other than the key treatment 
(A. Diamond & Sekhon, 2006; Sekhon, 2004). As our “treatment” is 
trichotomous, we follow the recommendation of Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart 
(2007) and dichotomize our variable to ensure that all comparisons are 
made.
18
 After generating matched data based on three combinations of 
autonomy status, we estimated Bayesian nonlinear mixed-effects models 
(Hadfield, 2010), shown in Table 3. 
Although we are unable to conduct comparisons with our full model due 
to insufficient matches when including external support, we show that the 
posited relationship between autonomy status and separatism holds when 
using matched data on a reduced model without external support: Autonomy 
loss significantly increases the likelihood of a group becoming separatist 
compared with both autonomous and never autonomous groups, and 
currently autonomous groups are generally more likely to become separatist 
than groups who were never autonomous. Although the robustness of these 
results to matching on covariates provides additional empirical support for 
our primary hypotheses, we recognize that it does not rule out other threats to 
valid inference. As matching only pushes the dependence back to the choice 
of criteria (variables, model) for defining the matches, there is still the 
possibility of omitted variables that could drive the matches, which in turn 
could influence the reported results. 
Next, we examine whether the results are robust to modifying the coding 
of the dependent variable from a dichotomous indicator of separatism to an 
ordered measure of the separatism. Using data from the Peace Research 
Institute Oslo’s conflict intensity data (N. P. Gleditsch, Wallensteen, 
Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002), combined with our indicator of 
separatism, we code for four levels of separatism: nonseparatist, separatist  
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Table 3. Models Using Matched Data. 
 Baseline: Baseline: Baseline: 
 Never Autonomous Never Autonomous Autonomous 
Intercept   0.70 (4.76)   -3.24 (1.91) 
*
   1.80 (2.87)  
Lost 
Autonomy  
 –   3.87 (0.41) 
*
   1.81 (0.44) 
*
  
Autonomous   1.06 (0.56)    –   –  
Democracy   0.82 (1.47)   -0.17 (0.68)   -0.19 (0.96)  
Partial 
Democracy  
 1.50 (1.21)   -0.36 (0.49)   0.14 (0.61)  
Group 
Concentration  
 -1.02 (99)   1.15 (0.22) 
*
   0.20 (0.25)  
E. Europe 
and (fmr) 
USSR  
 1.93 (3.07)   -3.54 (1.51) 
*
   -7.64 (2.31)
*
  
Latin 
America  
 -2.68 (2.22)   -2.97 (1.97)    -6.08 (3.40) 
*
  
North Africa 
and ME  
 3.25 (1.95)    0.26 (1.95)   -0.32 (3.00)  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
 -1.86 (1.41)   -2.93 (1.38) 
*
   -3.61 (2.16) 
*
 
Western 
Democracies  
 4.25 (3.23)   0.63 (2.10)   1.85 (4.02)  
Excluded 
Groups  
 -0.05 (0.07)   -0.02 (0.02)   0.01 (0.02)  
Logged 
GDPPC  
 -0.10 (0.74)   -0.14 (0.30)   0.12 (0.42)  
Oil   0.77 (0.52)   0.11 (0.41)   0.53 (0.37)  
Year (Fixed)   -0.01 (0.05)   0.02 (0.02)   -0.00 (0.03)  
       
Random 
Effects  
      
Country   1.58 (1.26) 
*
   12.17 (3.48) 
*
   20.75 (4.55) 
*
  
Log-
Likelihood  
 -23.39   -264.74  -214.61  
Deviance   46.77   529.49   459.23  
AIC   214.01  559.49   523.96  
BIC   264.57   628.34   452.83  
N   77   730   475  
Groups   21   86   66  
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations were weighted according to matched data. AIC = 
Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion. * 0.05<p . 
 
 
Table 4. Posterior Means for Bayesian Hierarchical Ordered Logistic Models. 
 
 
  Mean   Credible  
  (Std. Dev)  Intervals  
Autonomous  0.41 (0.47) [-0.52, 1.34] 
Lost Autonomy 1.91 (0.17) 
*
 [1.59, 2.25] 
Partial Democracy  -0.07 (0.24) [-0.54, 0.40] 
Democracy  -0.15 (0.29) [-0.73, 0.42] 
Group Concentration  0.53 (0.09) 
*
 [0.37, 0.70] 
External Support  1.02 (0.24) 
*
 [0.55, 1.50] 
Excluded Groups 0.01 (0.02) [-0.02, 0.44] 
GDPPC (Logged)  -0.11 (0.15) 
*
 [-0.42, -0.19] 
E. Europe/former USSR  -0.43 (0.71) [-1.71, 1.00] 
Latin America  -2.51 (0.42) [-2.99, -1.57] 
Middle East and North Africa  0.00 (.82) [-1.62, 1.57] 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.05 (0.64) [-2.13, 0.29] 
Western Democracies  0.20 (0.95) [-1.52, 0.20] 
Year  0.01 (0.31) [-0.02, 0.04] 
Post-Cold War  0.16 (0.01) [-0.45, 0.76] 
Cut-points – – 
No Separatism: Peaceful Separatism  -1.98 (0.02) 
*
 [-1.99, -1.93] 
Peaceful Separatism: Minor Conflict  0.35 (0.08) 
*
 [0.16, 0.52] 
Minor Conflict: Major Conflict  1.98 (0.02) 
*
 [1.93, 2.00] 
Countries  100  
Groups  324  
Group-Years 1198  
 
Standard deviations are in parentheses, 95% credible intervals in brackets. Minor conflict if less 
than 20 battle deaths per year, and major conflict if more than 20 battle deaths per year.  
*Indicates the probability of the coefficient being  < .05.  
 
but peaceful, minor separatist conflict (<25 battle deaths per year), and major 
separatist conflict (>25 battle deaths per year). The ordered model shows that 
groups that have lost autonomy are likely to engage in more intense 
separatism than both currently autonomous and never autonomous groups.
19
 
These results are displayed in Table 4.
20
 Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the the 
posterior densities and trace plots for groups that lost their autonomy and 
then for groups which were never autonomous.
21
 
Conclusion 
In his Second Treatise, John Locke observed that men are unlikely to cause 
revolutions for trivial reasons. This analysis shows that a tangible loss of 
autonomy is a nontrivial issue, and is robustly associated with separatism.  
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Figure 5. Posterior density plot for autonomous (L) and lost autonomy (R). 
 
Figure 6. Trace plot for autonomous (L) and lost autonomy (R). 
The retraction of autonomy provides a strong motive by invariably increasing 
grievances against the central state while not necessarily decreasing the 
group’s collective action capacity. By disaggregating the omitted category in 
research on the institutional determinants of conflict, and showing that lost 
autonomy represents a conceptually distinct class of group status, our 
findings go some way toward explaining the “empirical murkiness” within 
the academic literature on the relationship between institutional 
arrangements, such as ethno-federalism, and separatism. 
Taking concept formation seriously can yield new insights and can 
highlight important theoretical and empirical distinctions. By separating 
groups that have lost autonomy from groups who have never been 
autonomous—which were previously lumped together as “non-autonomous” 
in many analyses—this article contributes to the literature on decentralization 
and on secessionist collective action. Whether autonomy whets the appetite 
of ethnic groups to seek independence, or saps their desire by providing 
indirect rule, and some degree of control over their own affairs and fate, 
depends on the group’s beliefs about the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to guaranteeing its status. The results suggest that autonomous 
groups are not significantly more likely than groups that have never been 
autonomous to become separatists, but groups that lost autonomy are twice as 
likely to pursue secession, compared with currently autonomous and never 
autonomous groups. 
We are not unaware that this finding may have some implications for the 
rational design of institutional arrangements for peripheral regions. 
Containing nationalism is certainly possible. However, any state that is 
motivated to revoke autonomy on the basis of anticipated economic or 
political benefits for the state must weigh these potential benefits against the 
increase in the probability that the group will pursue separatism. Future 
research should unpack the circumstances under which different states are 
going to find the costs to outweigh the benefits. From Asia to Europe and 
Africa, states that have elected to retract autonomy as a means to rally 
political support for elections, to secure economic benefits from lootable 
resources or transit fees, or to remove a potential fifth column, have found 
that the costs often exceed the benefits, for groups frequently reply to a 
diminution of their status by mobilizing for separatism. The Albanian 
Kosovars in Serbia, the Abkhaz in Georgia, the Tibetans and Uighurs in 
China, or the South Sudanese and Biafrans in Africa all illustrate this state-
group dynamic. 
While these qualifications highlight the need for further research into the 
causal mechanisms responsible for the mobilization of ethnic groups and the 
intensity of separatist campaigns, we believe this article represents a 
significant contribution to our understanding of autonomy and separatism. 
Using newly disaggregated empirical evidence on the loss of autonomous 
status and data on separatism, the analysis indicates that retracted autonomy 
increases grievances against the central state while often failing to reduce the 
group’s collective action capacity. These results address an important debate 
with a new conceptual angle and new data, while suggesting new directions 
for future research. 
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Notes 
1. For a case to satisfy the definition of autonomy adopted here, this arrangement 
must be institutionalized, yet we recognize that the extent of institutionalization 
varies by country and context. For example, in relatively strong states, such as 
Spain, the formal limits of autonomy (e.g., for Catalonia) may be very well 
specified, whereas in weaker states, autonomy may be less formalized, but 
nonetheless widely recognized and acknowledged (e.g., Westerners in Cameroon 
prior to 1975). 
2. Artur Mas I Gavarro of the CDC. 
3. We are cognizant that the meaning of autonomy is contextual, and may vary not 
only from place to place but also over time. This is especially an issue for 
autonomies in autocracies, where the degree of self-rule is often pro forma. In 
China, for instance, formal autonomy is mainly a fiction—formally autonomous 
Xinjiang and Tibet are arguably less autonomous than Shanghai or Guangdong, 
which are not formally autonomous. In our coding of such cases, we are careful to 
account for this contextual difference across countries. We also conduct the 
analysis controlling for regime type, and with separate samples for each regime 
type, to examine whether the main results are robust. 
4. We are cognizant that separatism is often ill-defined. Some (Treisman, 1997) 
argue separatism is a “spectrum” from demands to increased local powers through 
full separation from the state (p. 214). Here, we follow Cederman, Wimmer, and 
Min (2010) in defining separatism as the pursuit of independence from the central 
government—not necessarily the achievement of independence. 
5. Although we focus on the pursuit of secession, rather than on rebellion in this 
article, this disaggregated approach may also shed light on the findings in Gurr 
(1993) and Gurr and Moore (1997); in the former, lost autonomy was a significant 
predictor of rebellion, but it was not in the latter. 
6. These events have led some scholars to describe the ensuing conflict as one based 
on contestation of resources, rather than ethnic differences (Suliman, 1997). Our 
position is that seizing oil fields, and instituting Islamic policies, were both part of 
the process of reducing the South’s autonomy, and is therefore consistent with our 
argument. 
7. While not directly related to separatism, see Posner’s (2004) discussion of how the 
ethnic makeup within different states alters the salience of ethnic cleavages. 
8. http://www.epr.ucla.edu/ 
9. www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar 
10. The original coding is unordered with four levels: No Separatism, Latent 
Separatism, Historical (1940-1980) Separatism, and Active (1980-2000) 
Separatism. As our main interest here is on the presence of separatism, we coded a 
group-year as “1” if it met either the condition of Historical or Active Separatism 
for that year. We then checked these findings against Ethnic Power Relations’ 
(EPR) Secessionist Autonomy indicator as well as the Minorities at Risk (MAR) 
Qualitative data to ensure there was an active separatist movement for the group in 
the given period. The results from an ordered model produce similar results (Table 
4) and thus we focus on discussing the more straightforward findings using a 
dichotomous dependent variable in our main analyses (Table 2). 
11. The AUTLOST index is calculated by adding the values of the group’s prior status 
and the magnitude of autonomy change, subtracting 1, and then dividing by a 
factor indicating the decade of autonomy retraction. We also cross-examined the 
results with MAR qualitative data and EPR’s “auton” variable. 
12. This variable measures percentage of an ethnic group living within a particular 
region of the state. Groups not in the MAR data were assigned according to these 
criteria. 
13. For example, to measure support in 1980, we took values from 1975 to 1980 and 
took the mean. 
14. We estimated a Bayesian Hierarchical Logistic regression model using the JAGS 
statistical software. See Table 4 in the main text. 
15. See Table A1 in the online appendix for a pooled analysis of the data that treats the 
pre- and post-Cold War periods as distinct. 
16. Or compared with a monkey throwing darts, to use a recently publicized example. 
See “Political Scientists Are Terrible Predictors,” The New York Times, June 24, 
2012. 
17. In the plot, the horizontal lines represent 2 standard errors, while the points 
represent the estimated coefficient. 
18. Matching therefore encompasses comparisons between groups who were never 
autonomous and groups who lost their autonomy, and groups who were never 
autonomous and groups who are currently autonomous. 
19. It also shows that there is no statistically significant difference between 
autonomous groups and groups which have never had autonomy in terms of the 
likelihood to engage in intense separatism. 
20. We adopt a Bayesian approach for this model and allowed the model 500,000 
iterations, with a burn-in of 200,000 iterations. 
21. As an additional check, reported in the supplementary online appendix, we divide 
the autonomy lost indicator further into autonomy lost more or less than 50 years 
prior to the year t. If a group lost autonomy in 1930, it was classified as having 
autonomy lost within 50 years until 1980, and then as having lost autonomy more 
than 50 years ago. It shows that both more recent and more distant losses of 
autonomy lead to separatism more often than among autonomous groups and never 
autonomous groups (the baseline category). 
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